The Counterpunch Campaign

By Ezra

Noam Scheiber writes:

Obama doesn't seem especially intoxicated by power. He'd just like you to buy into this brand called Barack Obama, which the presidency may enrich, but which may ultimately be more important to him than the presidency itself.

Understanding this feature of Obama's personality can explain a lot about the campaign. For example, it immediately becomes clear why he often seems reluctant to attack. For one thing, launching an attack can make a politician look cheap and tacky, which is the opposite of how Obama wants to come off. More broadly, Obama's not particularly interested in his opponents, period. By disposition, Obama prefers to put his own strengths at the center of his campaign; any time spent talking about opponents is less time spent talking about himself.

Having said that, it would be a mistake to assume that the ego-driven candidate is, in the end, any less willing to attack. The real difference is the circumstances. Clinton can seamlessly slip into attack mode whenever campaign tactics require it. For Obama, the attacks tend to come when his ego is challenged. At a press conference in Fort Dodge just before Obama's last event of the trip, a reporter asked about a line from a Clinton economic speech earlier in the day. "There is one job we can't afford on-the-job training for-that's the job of our next president," Clinton had said. Obama's tart response: "My understanding was that she wasn't Treasury secretary in the Clinton administration, so I don't know exactly what experiences she's claiming."[...]

"The one thing I won't tolerate is people trying to play that stuff on me." [Obama said.] "The one thing I hope people have become very clear about-and, if not, I will remind them-is I won't be a punching bag for anybody. . . . If they come at me hard, I will come back at them harder."

That all seems to be a perfectly accurate description of the Obama campaign. His is a counterpunch campaign -- almost all of the fight he's been in, all the battles you can remember, were actually started by the Clinton camp. Obama doesn't back down from any of these wars. But nor does he start the day by going on the offensive.

This doesn't strike me as a particularly effective way to run a presidential campaign. When you let the other side start all the fights, you let their framing rest as the foundation -- even if it's a contested foundation -- for the ensuing conversation. So every fight Clinton has picked with Obama has been about his "inexperience." Obama's response, depending on the subject, has been about Hillary's national security hawkishness, her DC insiderism, her caution, her doublespeak, etc. It's not been nearly as effective in constructing a coherent, negative, narrative against Clinton.

In answer to this, Obama basically says: Look how well I'm doing. And he's right! His campaign is doing very well. It seems entirely possible that they'll win Iowa, and with it, the nomination. But that's not necessarily because they've been running a great campaign, but because the primaries simply work differently. They are not, remember, in the lead nationally. They are possibly in the lead in Iowa. And specific things are happening there: Edwards has been launching the ceaseless attacks on Clinton that Obama won't, dragging down her numbers even as he slightly undercuts his. That won't happen in the general. The media has turned on Hillary a bit. That can't be relied on against the Republican in the general. Lots of people can see Obama at his best -- on a stage, under the lights, in person. That won't happen in the general. Etc, and so on.

All this is not to say Obama is wrong in his strategy. His campaign may just be accurately assessing the dynamics of the primary and working to manipulate them. But the factors which are letting them creep ahead in Iowa are not necessarily analogous to what will be needed in the general campaign. The question is whether the Obama camp knows that, or whether the candidate has incorporated his slow movement into the lead as vindication of his strategy, of his sense of self, as Brand Obama. That would, I think, be the wrong lesson.

Okay: Back to Amsterdam.