The "Surge" Isn't Working

by Stephen of the Thinkery

To followup on my previous post about sectarian violence in Iraq, the New York Times reports today that the "surge" of American troops, far from reducing sectarian divisions in Iraq, has actually contributed to an increase:

The number of Iraqis fleeing their homes has soared since the American troop increase began in February, according to data from two humanitarian groups, accelerating the partition of the country into sectarian enclaves.

Actively turning Iraq into a collection of homogeneous, heavily armed, insulated and well-defined geographic regions is hardly going to alleviate sectarian strife.  And here is a disturbing suggestion that the very plan put in action to deal with the problem of sectarian violence and division is making the problem worse.

Update:  ThinkProgress has an excellent compilation of facts - facts, not spin, not assumptions - regarding the results of Bush's "surge."  I'll reproduce the entire post after the jump, because it's just not possible to break it up.

Yesterday, the National Intelligence Estimate reported “measurable but uneven improvements” in the security situation in Iraq. While the White House has rushed to suggest that the modest gains were the result of escalation, the improvement can more plausibly be the product of Iraqi expectations of a U.S. withdrawal. (Some gains have also resulted because large numbers of Iraqis have fled their homes and ethnic cleansing has taken place.)

Much of the touted security gains have come in the Anbar province, a region that was not the target of Bush’s escalation. In fact, progress in Anbar pre-dated the surge and occurred while troop numbers were being reduced in the region.

The NIE states that local security arrangements such as those in Anbar province are being formed in response to imminent U.S. withdrawal, and that these “bottom up” security initiatives “represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months”:

“[F]earing a Coalition withdrawal, some tribal elements and Sunni groups probably will continue to seek accommodation with the Coalition to strengthen themselves for a post- Coalition security environment” […]

“The IC assesses that the emergence of ‘bottom-up’ security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them.”

In April, Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged, “The debate in Congress…has been helpful in demonstrating to the Iraqis that American patience is limited.” It appears that the Iraqi expectation of a U.S. troop reduction has actually produced tangible progress.

The New York Times reported that Sunnis’ perception of an impending withdrawal changed their attitudes. “Many Sunnis, for their part, are less inclined to see the soldiers as occupiers now that it is clear that American troop reductions are all but inevitable, and they are more concerned with strengthening their ability to fend off threats from Sunni jihadists and Shiite militias,” the Times wrote in July. In fact, leading Sunnis continue to demand a timetable for withdrawal.

Gareth Porter, writing for Inter Press Service, reported recently, “The apparent success of Petraeus’s shift from relying on U.S. military force to relying on Sunni troops to take care of al Qaeda could be used as an argument against continuation of the U.S. military presence in Anbar.” He added:

Recognition that there is a far more effective alternative to U.S. military operations to reduce al Qaeda’s influence would be a major blow to George W. Bush’s argument against a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. troops, which has relied increasingly on the threat of an al Qaeda haven in Iraq.

When we look at facts instead of assumptions about the nature of the Iraqi people, we start to see that perhaps what's really needed to secure Iraq is to do the following:

• Remove Iraq as a favorable destination for foreign terrorist groups
• Remove different groups' ability to claim favoritism on the part of American forces
• Remove outside meddling in everything from the highest levels of the Iraqi government down to where a particular police unit will patrol for the evening
• Give the people who actually live in Iraq, who understand the culture, who are a part of the various factions themselves to work on their own security problems and solutions.  This is happening, right now, in Anbar province and is, as noted above, the majority of the "success" that the Bush Administration is claiming for themselves.

What, pray tell, can we possibly take seriously from the Bush Administration?  They ram a "surge" down everone's throat, send tired, ill-equipped and even injured troops back to Iraq, claim that the "surge" will produce results within months and then, when their grand plans fail once again, take credit for what the Iraqis have been able to accomplish all on their own.

Oh, and they've whined constantly about the inability of the Iraqis to "take responsibility" for themselves the entire time.  How classy.

Obviously the lives of American soldiers and Iraqi citizens are worth far less to the Bush Administration and its enablers among the Very Serious People in DC than the fear that the same people who were right all along about the inadvisability of invading Iraq in the first place just might also be right about what a ridiculous idea the "surge" was in the first place.

The American presence in Iraq is a catalyst for violence, even sectarian conflict, as various groups believe that others are collaborating with the occupying force.  Our presence hinders Iraqi forces from acting as they see fit.  For the good of American soldiers and the Iraqi people, it's time to get out.  Anyone - anyone - who thinks that withdrawing American forces from Iraq would guarantee a worse situation that what we have now is misinformed to the point of possibly being delusional.