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September 21, 2007
Collective Action Problems in Iraq
Ilan Goldenberg reports from Cato, where former Special Envoy to Places You'd Be Afraid to Visit James Dobbins made this point:
Dobbins argued that in every case of trying to fix a failed state the neighbors play a critical role. They have serious national interests because they are the ones who have to deal with the refugees, violence, crime, economic shocks and all the other wonderful things that happen as a result of a total meltdown on your border. They simply are not going to sit on the sidelines.
All of the neighbors have an interest in maintaining stability. To do this they search for proxies who will carry out their agenda. Paradoxically, this proxy strategy only ends up exacerbating the situation by strengthening various warring parties and creating greater potential for broader regional conflict. The only way around this, is to create a regional dialogue that forces all the neighbors to come together and coordinate their strategies. Instead of a zero sum game they should be working towards the same greater goal of keeping Iraq from totally falling apart.
I think this is missing a piece, however. Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the rest surely recognize that they need to coordinate in order to achieve stability in Iraq. They don't need America to explain that to them. At the moment, however, none of the regional partners actually want a stable, functioning Iraq -- because currently, a stable, functioning Iraq would be occupied and effectively controlled by America. And Iran doesn't want an American vessel next door.
So their incentives work basically like this: Amass proxies who they can use to keep some sort of control over the nation and, if necessary, drive us out. Once that's done, begin working to use those proxies to stabilize the nation. So long as we're occupying the place, however, it's decidedly not in Iran or Syria's interest to stabilize the country -- from their perspective, they'd be stabilizing a military platform that Washington can eventually use for its long-stated goals of regime change. So their proxy strategy is not, I'd suggest, accidentally working against stabilization, but rather, working to ensure Iranian influence after we leave and stabilization becomes a non-threatening goal for them.
September 21, 2007 | Permalink
Comments
Another item to consider is that a stable functioning independent (occupied or not) Iraq would have influence on world oil prices. I'm sure the Saudis and Iranians would like something to say about that too. Palast argued that it was in their interests to suppress Iraqi production. If so then they don't necessarily have an interest in a stable (at least not too stable) Iraq, with or without a US occupation.
Posted by: Mr. Lynne | Sep 21, 2007 11:29:51 AM
Uh huh. That's very interesting, Ezra. But even more interesting would be to hear an explanation for the suspicious silence of liberal blogs on the news that spineless Dem Senators condemned the MoveOn ad. The decision to cave in to republican presure is going to haunt them in 2008. Somewhere I read about the possible headlines in 2008:"Extremist organization, condemned in a bipartisan Senate bill before, supprts Senator X!". We can be dead certain that this is exactly what will happen in the run-up to the next elections. Again, an idiotic decision by those Dem traitors. All they had to do was they don't like the ad, but take the first ammendment seriously and are against any attempts to silence the political discourse. Fools.
Am I right that you stay away from this topic out of partisan reasons? Not wanting to add insult to injury, hmm?
Posted by: Gray | Sep 21, 2007 11:49:35 AM
I think you have it correct, Ezra, but the negative incentive for cooperation while the US is present applies to all the neighbors, in varying degrees. I don't think, for instance, that Saudi Arabia really wants a US client state next door since that will incite the anti-US factions within their country and they don't want troubled waters internal to their country. There are Shia in Saudi Arabia (in their oil provinces, no less) and there are anti-Royalty elements within the Sunni ranks as well.
Syria surely doesn't want the US on its eastern border with Israel to the west. Jordan doesn't want any unsetting influences near them, with millions of Palestinian 'refugees' in Jordan, anti-Royal elements, Kurds, and some hostile Sunnis, etc. (The Alewite minority but ruling class is apart from Sunni Islam.)
Turkey probably doesn't want the Kurds protected by US forces, creating a safe haven for Turkish terrorists from the Kurd minority in Turkey to take refuge within.
And surely Russia and China don't want the US permanently on their southern borders or nearby. So far, they have been by-standers regarding Iraq (and Iran). But notice that Russia has taken a strong stand against any military action against Iran, and the Chinese are likely to join Russia since China gets lots of oil from Iran.
Kuwait and the gulf oil emirates probably accept or welcome US permanent presence in Iraq because of their fear of Iran (and to some degree the Shia majority in southern Iraq), but they surely can't welcome continued turmoil in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea that US threats against Iran continue to bring.
So, who does want the US in Iraq for a long time: Israel and some smaller gulf states. And of course, the Oil Majors. Plus, the US defense/security/supply/construction contractors making money hand over fist.
Someday, the Iraqis will tell us to leave, both Sunni and Shia. The Sunni's are 90% opposed to our presence and the Shia are over 50%. Why wait for that humiliation to occur, since that will really be a defeat for US prestige and cement our failure in Iraq.
We need to exit soon, nearly completely, and while there is some regional acceptance of our presence. That acceptance won't last forwever.
Posted by: JimPortlandOR | Sep 21, 2007 11:49:44 AM
Does stabilization necessarily mean Iraq as an American vassal-state? I'm not so sure. Certainly the two states will be tied, but this line of thinking assumes that the ascendant political factions in a stable Iraq will be pro-US, which isn't the case. Viewing the spectrum of Iraqi politics, this is an impossibility. Nor does stabilization mean Iraq will be an Iranian vassal.
Stabilization in Iraq will be s complex process tied less to international pressures than it will be to local conditions. This is hard for many to imagine, as we view this through the prism of our own national interests. The discourse on the war is, to paraphrase that infamous NYT op-ed, Americacentric. This is as true on the left as it is on the left.
Furthermore, stabilization will require that international forces mediate their involvement in the future Iraq. For example, Sadr is going to remain a powerful player. He will be brought on board which can only be effected if both the US and Iran temper their involvement in Iraqi politics. The US in particular will have to come to accept that they cannot marginalize him politically by striking at his support base militarily. Iran and SIIC will have to acknowledge the futility of undercutting him. Similarly, if any accord is reached with the Sunni parties, as will be required, groups like the SIIC and the PUK will have to back away a bit from Iran.
As for the Saudis and the Jordanians, what is surprising how little influence they have in Iraq. They'll try to get in on any deal, but I don't see how this will translate into influence on the ground. Same with the Syrians, though they're in a better position, especially vis-à-vis the Baathists.
Stabilization in Iraq should not be seen simply as a victory for one foreign player over another. Rather, stabilization will necessarily entail the limiting of foreign influence, especially on the part of Iran and the US. And a stable Iraq will likely require -- for practical reasons -- a weak central state. With no center, the influence of foreign powers will be highly diffuse and uneven. Therefore, no one state can emerge "victorious" if Iraq is stabilized.
Posted by: Philippe | Sep 21, 2007 12:54:50 PM
Phillippe, obviously Ezra can speak for himself, but on my reading he would not be disagreeing with you a bit on the facts on the ground. He is simply presenting the Administration standpoint whereby they are baffled that the neighbors aren't eagerly volunteering to pull the Bushwagon with Bush/Cheney wielding the whip and taking credit for the cargo delivery.
On your last point about the influence of foreign powers with a weak center, well color me unconvinced. If Iranian proxies have effective control of Basra and the southern oil fields and have reasonable accomodation with the Shi'ia nationalists controlling the holy cities and Baghdad (i.e. Sadr) I suspect Iran will in fact be feeling pretty "victorious". And why not? Taking the long view the United States is just wrapping up the last stage of the Iran-Iraq War in favor of the Iranians. All (and that is a big 'all') the Iranians have to do is to keep Cheney from convincing Bush to drop the bombs between now and January 2009 and they get the win.
Posted by: Bruce Webb | Sep 21, 2007 1:28:14 PM
Wake up and smell the coffee, Ezra
Iran + Syria = already coordinated
Goal = control Iraq through proxies (done)
Goal = eventually destabilize the Saudi regime (soon)
Goal = control the greater middle east (after Iran goes nuclear)
Your conclusion about Iran's want for control over the Iraqi government is off insofar as Iran already controls the current Iraqi government. You seem to assume that they are not quite there yet. They are.
Posted by: Tony | Sep 22, 2007 3:11:19 AM
Posted by: ykksi | Oct 1, 2007 9:10:44 PM
