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May 27, 2006

Morality is Objective (And People Are Wrong)

By Neil the Ethical Werewolf

A week is an eternity in the political blogosphere, but it's a  short time in the world of philosophy.  Or at least, that's my excuse for responding now to a couple of Matt Yglesias' week-old posts on the objectivity of morality.  Some things Matt says in the course of arguing against the existence of objective moral facts really don't have much bearing on the question of objectivity.  In fact, many of his criticisms apply just as well to areas of inquiry where objective truth is clearly at stake.  (In other words, I'm saying that his criteria for objectivity aren't good.)  Let's first consider this:

Sometimes, you face a question that you think has an objective answer like "How much should we care about budget deficits?" What you're supposed to do in those circumstances is look at the evidence in an even-handed and objective way. The big issues of political commitment don't work like that at all. Siegel didn't go learn Arabic fluently, then read the Koran (it says you should only read it in Arabic), then study the works of Sayyid Qutb and other Islamist commentators, and then objectively weigh those arguments against the great names of liberal political thought in an open-minded and unprejudiced way before deciding, "Yes, those Islamists are all wrong!" That would be dumb, and nobody lives their life like that.

Matt's pointing out that the way we usually arrive at moral beliefs is quite different from the way we ought to arrive at beliefs on the empirical questions that drive public policy.  That seems right.  But it's important to note that very few people -- Matt and Ezra perhaps, but not most of us -- actually arrive at their public policy views in much the same way.  Most people don't wonk out on pdfs from Brookings, seek out the best arguments from all sides, and make well-considered decisions.  Emotional judgments from gut feelings, sadly, play an outsized role in determining many ordinary people's beliefs on issues where there are objective right and wrong answers.  You don't even need to go to normatively laden questions of the "How much should we care" variety to see this.  You can just look at ordinary, purely descriptive questions -- "Do tax cuts stimulate the economy more or less than spending increases?" or "Which candidate is more electable?" to find places where many people's emotional attitudes (for example, their feelings about taxation or about the candidates) determine what sorts of beliefs they form. 

Does this tear away the objectivity from facts of public policy?  I don't think so.  All it says is that people are forming their public policy beliefs in an unreliable and untrustworthy way.  All the more reason to recognize the possibility of error within ourselves, and dedicate some energy to thinking clearly, considering well-collected empirical data, and listening carefully to all sides.  Similarly, the fact that people tend to make emotionally driven moral judgments doesn't mean that morality isn't objective.  It just means that we're likely to make mistakes, and so we need to understand that our intuitive moral judgments could be wrong.  Objective truth could still be out there -- we're just bad at finding it.   

This attitude towards moral belief underlies my own approach to the issue.  I think that people very often go wrong in their beliefs about the objective moral facts.  How do I separate the true moral beliefs from the false ones?  I first try to determine what sorts of processes of belief-formation are generally reliable, considering many examples where morality isn't at stake.  Then I look at all the ways that people form their beliefs about which states of affairs are good, and which actions are right.  I throw out the beliefs that are generated by unreliable processes.  Particularly, I throw out the beliefs formed by having some emotionally-driven attitude towards a state of affairs, and thus coming to believe that there's some objective goodness or badness out there in that state of affairs.  All that's left is the goodness of pleasure and the badness of displeasure, which can be discovered without any emotions standing between us and our pleasure or displeasure.  You can know that your sensations of black are sensations of darkness without any emotion standing between you and the black, and similarly, you can know that your experiences of pleasure are experiences of goodness without any emotion standing between you and the pleasure.  Looking at your experiences and determining what they're like, with no emotional interference, is a reliable way of knowing.  So the objective goodness of pleasure and the objective badness of displeasure are all we can know of objective goodness and badness.

Another related point Matt makes:

Islamists do a lot of stuff that seems cruel and repugnant -- sawing off peoples' heads, for example or stoning gay people to death. Is that "really" wrong? Do I need to check? Deduce it from first principles? If I can't come up with an airtight argument against head-sawing within the next fifteen minutes, does that throw everything into doubt? Again, that's silly; nobody thinks that.

The fact that we don't usually require airtight arguments for moral conclusions doesn't really bear much on the question of objectivity. Consider the easier questions of physics -- you don't need to determine the gravitational constant  in order to know that when you shoot a basketball, it'll travel in an arc, and eventually come down.  But physics is an objective matter, if anything is.  So there's nothing incompatible between our being able to get it right on a fair number of the objective questions, and saying that we haven't got a good theory worked out to decide the hard cases and explain everything.  (Of course, once we do figure out the gravitational constant and build our theory, we can do all sorts of neat stuff.)  My point here shouldn't be taken as a rejection of the idea that we're often wrong, or unjustified, in our moral judgments.  All I'm saying is that it's possible to occasionally make correct judgments while lacking any developed theory to explain them. 

There's this, from Matt's next post:

When you argue with people, you try to appeal to shared sentiments, point out alleged inconsistencies in the other guy's position, and so on and so forth. What underlies the possibility of discussion isn't objective moral truth but the fact that, say, Jonah and I have a vast stockpile of things we agree about and one tries to resolve controversies with appeals to stuff in that store of previous agreement.

What I want to say to Matt here is that objective moral truth actually underlies the possibility of this kind of discussion.  Why is it interesting, in these discussions, to point out "alleged inconsistencies in the other guy's position"?  Why would he even care about inconsistencies?  Here's one answer: because his position consists of his beliefs, and when you have inconsistent beliefs, at least one of them has to be false.  And why is it a problem that one is false?  Because our beliefs aspire to objective truth, and when they are false, they fail. 

Now, there are sophisticated versions of anti-realism that propose their own answers to these questions, like those offered by Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard (Matt links to one of Blackburn's books in his post).  I reject their views because I reject deflationary theories of truth, but that's a fairly technical issue that I won't get into here.

One more thing to quibble with Matt about:

Sometimes you face someone whose disagreements with you are so profound that appeals to shared premises don't get you anywhere. Or you face someone who just doesn't care about doing the right thing. It's precisely because there's no way to decide who's objectively right in a dispute between, say, Adolf Hitler and liberal democracy, that we resolve the biggest moral controversies with force and threats of force rather than moral discourse and appeals to conscience. Debate and deliberation only work for the small stuff.

But this doesn't really have that much to do with objectivity either.  It's an objective question whether or not Allah exists.  He exists or he doesn't.  But people are really set in their beliefs on this issue, some for good reasons and others for bad reasons.  And this is the kind of disagreement that could conceivably (and does actually) cause people to start using force against one another.  Similarly, you don't have to take morality outside the domain of objectivity to explain why people wouldn't be able to settle their differences through debate.  Sometimes people just can't come to agreement on a question with an objective answer, and their desires are such that this lack of agreement seems to them like something worth fighting about. 

If there's a single take-home message to all of this, here it is: Don't just throw out the idea that there are objective facts somewhere, just because people keep forming their beliefs in wacky ways, or because there's a lot of disagreement, or because everyone is fighting over stuff.  It's still possible that there are objective facts, and the people just aren't being very smart about figuring them out. 

May 27, 2006 | Permalink

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Comments

Frankly, I didn't follow all of your arguments, but I definitely don't agree with your conclusions. The reason most of us can argue with each other about who's position is more consistant is because most value the tenents of logic:

identity (A is A)
non-contradiction (if you say 'A', you cannot also say 'NOT A')

Are these tenents true in some ultimate sense or are just things which most of us hold as values? Well that's a pretty damn fundamental question as it underlies all three branches of philosophy (metaphysics, epistemology, value-theory), but I don't think it is necessary to go that far to argue for non-cognitivism.

1) Some argue that a world without objective moral truths is unworkable. This is easy to sell because it conforms to common assumptions, but it doesn't stand up to much scrutiny. As Matt argued, you wouldn't be able to tell a world with objective moral truths apart from a world without.

2) The fact that most of us want our values to be validated as objective truths does not proove that any of us can have that. Frankly, even though they have the historical momentum, I think the burden of proof is upon those who insist values have an ultimately rational basis.

Posted by: pantomimeHorse | May 27, 2006 7:23:51 AM

Then again, if you have a valid moral compass, all of this navel-gazing becomes inane.

Posted by: Hucbald | May 27, 2006 7:23:57 AM

Er, if you know the answer already, then, yes, asking the question is pointless.

Posted by: pantomimeHorse | May 27, 2006 7:55:21 AM

"All that's left is the goodness of pleasure and the badness of displeasure, which can be discovered without any emotions standing between us and our pleasure or displeasure."

You're deploying an awful lot of intellectual firepower just to justify the animal porn under your mattress. Also, I'm not clear on whether you're saying that pleasure is touchstone by which we do determine moral truths or the one by which we should determine moral truths. And is there some sort of utilitiarian calculus at the back of this that constrains my pleasure (GORE!) where it impinges on yours (edwards)?

"All I'm saying is that it's possible to occasionally make correct judgments while lacking any developed theory to explain them."

Is this the same as "A stopped clock watch is correct twice a day"?

"Here's one answer: because his position consists of his beliefs, and when you have inconsistent beliefs, at least one of them has to be false."

I've never been clear on why this can't simply be a mental tick, a function that forces us both towards coherent theories of physics(valuable) and coherent theories of "90210" (or, for the kids, "The O.C.", I guess". Doesn't this only really indicate that we'd like our moral truths to be objective, just as we like to pretend our tastes are objective?

"Similarly, you don't have to take morality outside the domain of objectivity to explain why people wouldn't be able to settle their differences through debate."

I thought MYs point here was that you don't need an object moral fact to justify a war. We can reasonably go to war to vindicate our belief that chocolate ice cream is superior to all other flavors.

Finally, is there some magical way to use the normal html tags? I've tried to use [i] and [em] and neither works on preview.

Posted by: SomeCallMeTim | May 27, 2006 9:11:55 AM

Just to note that the above is even more of a mess than is usual for me, because of the html tag issue. It is objectively true that Ezra deserves to be shot.

Posted by: SomeCallMeTim | May 27, 2006 9:14:48 AM

Horse, I think the idea of objective truth is important for explaining why the laws of logic apply to beliefs and not to matters of taste. If you believe that something is vanilla, also believe that it is chocolate, and believe that it isn't a mix of vanilla and chocolate, you're irrational. But there's nothing irrational about liking vanilla and liking chocolate, and disliking the mix. When you start saying that moral views are things like matters of taste -- that is, things to which objective truth doesn't apply -- you lose the reason for applying the law of noncontradiction to them.

Tim, I'm saying that facts about pleasure really determine which moral claims are true and which are false, independently of what people think. So I'm only arguing that utilitarianism is right, not that everybody holds it. And there's arguments I haven't given here that make everybody's pleasure the key thing, not just any one person's.

Stopped clock... yeah, that's pretty close to what I'm saying.

If Matt is saying that we _could_ go to war over non-objective things, I don't disagree. I thought he was saying that discussion ends _because_ the issues aren't objective, which is a stronger claim and one I deny.

Posted by: Neil the Ethical Werewolf | May 27, 2006 11:41:24 AM

discussion ends _because_ the issues aren't objective, which is a stronger claim and one I deny.

I took him to be saying that whether or not the issues are objective is irrelevant to decisions we appear to make on the basis of those issues, because, at this time, whatever methodology one uses to validate a moral claim (e.g., moral intuition) will be culturally determined. Which, if I'm understanding this correctly, seems to split the difference between the two positions (your Matt and your own) you are referencing.

You are being studiously silent about whether we ought to shoot Ezra (though the html tags now seem to work).

Posted by: SomeCallMeTim | May 27, 2006 12:27:40 PM

no studious silence here...
may not even a hair
on ezra's head
be harmed.

Posted by: jacqueline | May 27, 2006 12:36:38 PM

"So the objective goodness of pleasure and the objective badness of displeasure are all we can know of objective goodness and badness."

It's apodictic that pleasure is good and displeasure bad? That's a bit strange--what if someone disputed you on this? Remember your G.E. Moore--I can still look at pleasure and ask, "Is this good?" If you don't mean an assertion of identity, then I can still challenge it--you need to offer some justification, not just assertion.

And if you really do mean identity, then you don't just run afoul of Moore. You sacrifice any claim to this being moral knowledge. After all, then it's just an identity--you can't justify it, and it's probably a mistake to say you "believe" it. I don't "believe" that 2=2--I just don't know what it would mean to say otherwise.

Last, if this is knowledge, by what reason do you say this is all we can know? You're very optimistic about "reliable processes", but here you haven't given any sort of process--just assertion. What you've done is suggest that the most reliable process is no process at all--look and know, with certainty, that it's true. Is it then objective just because I insist on it?

Posted by: Thuloid | May 27, 2006 2:14:40 PM

The Party of Indefensible Causal Assertions ...djw at Lawyers, Guns, and Money

"This is the sort of causal logic the whole "culture of life, party of death" rhetoric is built on. It's a fundamentally unserious approach to understanding the world."

This fundamentally unserious Party has control of both houses of Congress, the White House, and the Supreme Court. Their rhetoric may be dishonest and illogical, but they win with it. It is the reality-based party of truth and reason that is unserious. What is more important, your integrity, both moral and intellectual, or hundreds of thousands dead in Iraq?

Posted by: bob mcmanus | May 27, 2006 3:10:34 PM

The serious part of the ruling party is they aim to win and the ends justify the means. How can adopting that dysfunction restore government responsive to the people ?

Posted by: opit | May 27, 2006 3:30:18 PM

"How can adopting that dysfunction restore government responsive to the people ?"

Because we are better. And since I think about 30% of "the people" are themselves dysfunctional, even dangerously insane, I am not so enthusiastic about government being responsive to the people. Iraq was not an unpopular war at its inception.

Note my comment was about a Party, not its leadership.

Posted by: bob mcmanus | May 27, 2006 4:07:06 PM

Whether it is objectively true that Ezra deserves to be shot supervenes on non-normative facts such as those under discussion here and here. Since we do not know all of the relevant descriptive facts, we cannot know the normative facts.

Posted by: Blar | May 27, 2006 7:00:37 PM

Thuloid, my response to Moore is basically the standard naturalistic moral realist line. The pleasure=good identity is an a posteriori identity like the water=H2O identity. Even if you can't believe that 2=2
(I happen to think you can, but let's set that aside) you can definitely believe that water=H2O. People can without any incoherence doubt that pleasure is good. People can also without any incoherence doubt that water is H2O (alchemists and early chemists doubted this).

I do move rather quickly from the rejection of moral claims based on the projection of emotional attitudes into the world, to the assertion that only the goodness of pleasure and the badness of displeasure remain. If you can find some reliable process for generating beliefs about moral facts other than the method of phenomenological introspection I've outlined above, you can get some other value properties in the picture, and we don't have to be utilitarians anymore. If Kant's arguments worked, that's where we'd be. But I don't yet see anything else that fits the bill.

Posted by: Neil the Ethical Werewolf | May 27, 2006 10:29:20 PM

"When you start saying that moral views are things like matters of taste -- that is, things to which objective truth doesn't apply -- you lose the reason for applying the law of noncontradiction to them."

I don't think you're separating out underlying values from the expressions of those values. In the application of values, there is plenty to argue about; about the values themselves, there isn't any argument. At best, you can remind someone of their values to get them to privilege some values above others.

Posted by: pantomimeHorse | May 27, 2006 10:36:43 PM

Neil--
I don't see how the statement, "I believe 2=2" means anything. In what circumstance would I possibly utter such a phrase, and to what end? It's not that one can't believe it--it's just that the assertion seems pointless. But that is beside the point.

You recognize then that some justification is required (obviously, as people can doubt that pleasure is good). What is it? If I follow you, you're saying that because other approaches for generating beliefs about moral facts aren't presenting themselves, we have to go with this one. I don't think we do, so I don't see how that's much justification.

The trouble is that if these beliefs are formed on the basis of introspection, it may well be that they really are purely subjective (though I don't hold this). We haven't established that emotional attitudes are "projected into the world" but attitudes like pleasure or displeasure are fundamentally dissimilar. We may not need to generate beliefs about moral facts at all.

Instead, it may be the case that moral facts are no more required to explain moral beliefs than facts about English grammar are required to explain our beliefs about English grammar. It's very possible to speak of such facts, but they aren't posited in order to explain beliefs. Instead, they're constituded by actual English speech. Our morality could be similar; that moral facts, if we want to use that phrase, are constituted by how we speak of morality--by our acts and by what we say to each other about those acts. Those facts would then be objective, but obviously this isn't a moral realist position.

Posted by: Thuloid | May 28, 2006 12:08:10 AM

Well, if you were making a bet with an irrational person, you might say "Okay, I believe 2=2 -- if the mathematician agrees with me, you pay for dinner. Otherwise I do."

The justification for accepting that pleasure is good comes out of the general reliability of phenomenal introspection. We're reliable in making the judgment that black-experiences are experiences of darkness, and I think we're similarly reliable in other judgments about our experiences. The goodness of pleasure is a fact like the darkness of black, and it can be discovered in the same reliable way.

Posted by: Neil the Ethical Werewolf | May 28, 2006 1:07:07 AM

"Particularly, I throw out the beliefs formed by having some emotionally-driven attitude towards a state of affairs"

Then you have a big pile of nothing. The whole argument you make for "objective moral facts" is just question-begging.

Posted by: rilkefan | May 28, 2006 1:44:32 AM

How would such a person recognize that you had won the bet, or that "I believe 2=2" does not mean "I do not believe 2=2"?

I don't think calling black darkness (or the other way around) is properly a result of introspection. I recognize black when I see it, introspection doesn't tell me anything more, and I didn't come to identify "dark" and "black" by way of introspection. The issue here isn't what I introspect so much as what we choose to say. There's no discovery here at all--instead, what we seem to be talking about is giving names. They're not reliable or unreliable--they're just how we speak.

If you want to say the same thing about pleasure and goodness, I'm with you to that extent--but then you ought to see that there are many more things we say about goodness which are on approximately the same level, so the identification of pleasure with good loses its foundational character.

Posted by: Thuloid | May 28, 2006 1:48:07 AM

Particularly, I throw out the beliefs formed by having some emotionally-driven attitude towards a state of affairs, and thus coming to believe that there's some objective goodness or badness out there in that state of affairs.

Interestingly, the research shows that people who don't have an "emotionally-driven" attitude, can't make up their minds (see Descartes Error about people with brain damage to emotion centers, who simply could not make decisions ... and this is an old argument from Aristotle as well, i.e. at some level, even "rational" reasons are effective based on how we feel about them).


Because our beliefs aspire to objective truth, and when they are false, they fail.

I think this is fundamentally incorrect view of how we make sense of reality. Human beings create narratives to make "sense" of the world, events and actions. In short, when something doesn't make sense, it doesn't fit in the story. So the issue is never, "is this objectively true," rather the question is, "is this a plausible story/explanation." The latter encompasses the former, and does not absolutely require "objective truth."

Posted by: a-train | May 29, 2006 11:25:44 AM

"It's an objective question whether or not Allah exists. He exists or he doesn't."

Unfortunately, you need to be Allah to answer the question. For the rest of us, its unanswerable.

Remember, there are three values on a truth test - True (proven to exist), False (proven to not exist), and Failure (unable to prove). Don't confuse False with Failure.

So does Allah exist? He either exists, or he does not exist, or we can't determine.

I don't understand why "objective" thinkers are so uncomfortable with uncertainty.

Posted by: pebird | May 29, 2006 5:10:14 PM

This question becomes more clear when morality is viewed as emerging from natural selection.

Certain behavior has in the past been objectively good for propagation. In a highly intelligent, communication rich society, those behaviors became associated with a psychological feeling, either to praise or shame (or whatever). The psychological association, like other prodcuts of natural selection was ad hoc, took lots of short cuts and was finely honed over many years.

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