Points of Contention

By Ezra

I've not been terribly pleased with the press's coverage of the Iraqi constitution delays, so tonight I did a think tank trawl trying to find something better. Best article? Nathan Brown's, over at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. According to him, It seems to be widely acknowledged, at least in the Iraqi press, that there are 18 points of contention. These are:

1. The name of Iraq [whether to describe it as federal and/or Islamic]
2. Religion [the precise formula by which the Islamic shari‘a will be described as a
source of law]
3. The constituent elements of the Iraqi people [whether various groups in Iraqi
society should be named and, if so, which ones]
4. Language [whether Kurdish should be co-equal with Arabic or official only in the
Kurdish region; the status of other languages]
5. Identity of Iraq [whether and how Iraq is described as Arab and Islamic]
6. The marja‘iyya [Shi‘i religious authority and whether it should be mentioned in
the constitution]
7. Holy places [The word used (‘atabat) generally refers to Shi‘i holy places]
8. The president of the republic [whether to make the position purely ceremonial or
allow it to have some executive responsibilities; the number of vice-presidents]
9. Ministers [whether ministers can or must also serve as members of parliament]
10. Matters related to natural resources [the distribution of oil revenues among
various levels of government]
11. Personal status [family law—whether it will be governed by a single legislated
code or whether it will be applied according to the sect of the litigants]
12. Voluntary union and the right of self-determination [a reference to a Kurdish
demand that the federation be described as voluntary and that the Kurdish right of
self-determination be affirmed]
13. [omitted from list; other versions of this list include the division of executive
authorities between the president and the prime minister on this point]
14. Dual citizenship [Whether it should be allowed for ordinary citizens and for high
officials]
15. The city of Kirkuk [Kurdish parties wish to have the procedure mentioned in
Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law affirmed and implementation
to begin immediately]
16. The borders of the Kurdistan region
17. Parliament [whether an upper house should be constructed with representation by
province and/or region]
18. The Transitional Administrative Law [whether its validity will be explicitly—if
somewhat retroactively—affirmed]

That's a fairly extensive list. On the bright side, various issues are at various stages of completion -- they're not all intractable conflicts stuck at the first step. Some of them, like whether MP's must be ministers, are fairly technical problems, while others, like the division of oil revenues and the articulated nature of the country, are quite a bit trickier. In the end, it comes down to federalism and power-sharing. The Kurds are happy with their current, semi-autonomous region, the Sunnis are afraid the Shi'ites will subject them to the same oppressive treatment that they they spent the last few decades imposing on the country, and the Shi'ites don't want their long-delayed return to power weakened by niceties and loopholes demanded by a deposed, fearful minority. All in all, an agreement isn't impossible, but neither is it looking likely. Brown's article, at least, helps explain why.